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Primary Causality and ibdii' (creare) in the Liber de causis
RICHARD

C. TAYLOR (Milwaukee/WI)

The Liber de causis ( LDC), a short metaphysical treatise translated into Latin in
the Twelfth century in all likelihood by the famous Gerard of Cremona at Toledo, exercised a powerful influence in the thinking of European theologians and
philosophers of the High Middle Ages and beyond, something easily evidenced
in the large number of extant Latin manuscripts (over 250) and commentaries as
well as the many references made to this work. 1 Its early importance to
metaphysical thinking on God and creation among the Latins led to its becoming
required reading for all who wished to understand the thought of Aristotle to
whom the Latin tradition attributed the text until Thomas Aquinas made known
its dependence on the Elements of Theology of Prod us. 2 While evidence of this
work in the Arabic tradition is very modest with only three manuscripts known
to be extant and no direct citations of it in what we have of the writings of the
most well known philosophers of the Classical tradition - al-Kindi, al-Farabi,
Avicenna, Averroes -, it has recently been argued that the Liber de causis
importantly and decisively influenced metaphysical thinking in the early formation of philosophy in the Islamic milieu from Greek sources in the era of alKindi.3 If this view is able to withstand critical scrutiny, the importance of the
Liber de causis for the Arabic tradition from the Ninth century and for the Latin
Tradition from the Twelfth century would earn that little work very special

1

For a thorou gh account of the status quaestionis of the texts of this work in Latin and
Arabic, of its sources, of secondary literature and more, see Cristina D ' Ancona and Richard C.
Taylor, ,Le Liber de causis",in: Dictionnaire des Philosophes Antiques. Supplement, ed. Richard
Goulet et al. Paris 2003, 599-647.
2
Ibid., 604-5.
3
Cristina D'Ancona, ,The Origins of Islamic Philosophy", in: The Cambridge History of
Philosophy in Late Antiquity, ed. Lioyd Gerson, C amb ridge 2010, Vol. 2, 869-893, 1170-1178.
In particular, see 879 where the author identifies a citation of a certain kitiib al- 'ulal mentioned
in Arabic version of Alexander of Aphrodisias, Qu. 2.19, as ,nothing else than the pseudoAristotelian Liber de causis of the Latin Middle Ages." For this the author draws on the work
of Silvia Fazzo and Hillary Wiesner in ,Alexander of Aphrodisias in the Kindi Circle and in alKindi's Cosmology", in: Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 3 (1 992) 119-153, in particular 152 sqq.
where the authors translate the Arabic text from MS Istanbul, Suleymaniye Kiitiiphanesi,
Carullah 1279, 63v-64r. On 139 they write, ,Such a reference tied to such a Proclan concept
encourages the hope that this might be the earliest appearance of the Liber de causis, appearing
anomalously by the name under which it travelled to the west. The phrase does not exactly
match any in the Liber de causis, although the terminology and the notion are at home in it."
The difficulty is that the LDC in Arabic is not called kitiib al-'ulal in its title or in any citations
in the Arabic tradition. Prof. D' Ancona was generous enough to share with me her discussion
of this issue in ,Nota sulla traduzione latina del Libra di Aristotele sull'esposizione del bene puro
e sui titolo Liber de Causis", forthcoming in a Festschrift for Gianfranco Fioravanti.
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prominence as an invaluable key to unpacking metaphysical accounts of creation
by philosophers of the Arabic tradition and theologians and philosophers of the
Latin tradition. Yet if that is so, then the honor must be shared to some extent
with the Neoplatonist Proclus.
The Liber de causis consists of quotations, paraphrases, interpretations, and
additions to texts extracted from the work of Proclus and also bears clear
evidence of the influence of Plotiniana Arabica (PA) texts derived from the
Enneads by the founder of Neoplatonism, Plotinus. 4 The works of those two
thinkers are more commonly considered not to promote a doctrine of creation
but rather something different, a teaching of a necessary emanation of reality
from the One which overflows insofar as it is also the Good. For example, in the
Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, four characteristics of Neoplatonic emanation in contrast to creation are listed by W. Hasker, the last of which is, ,The
emanation of a lower level from a higher is eternal and necessary; it follows from
the nature of the higher level, and does not involve or depend on a decision of
will. "5 In contrast, creation is joined with religious teachings and described by
Hasker as, ,The doctrine of the creation of the universe by God is common to
the monotheistic religions of Judaism, Christianity and Islam; reflection on cre ation has been most extensively developed within the Christian tradition. Creation is by a single supreme God, not a group of deities, and is an ,absolute' creation (creation ex nihilo, ,out of nothing') rather than being either a ,making' out of
previously existing material or an ,emanation' (outflow) from God's own nature.
Creation, furthermore, is a free act on God's part; he has no ,need' to create but
has done so out of love and generosity. He not only created the universe ,in the

4

The PA draws on Plotinus, Enneads IV-VI but does so within an interpretive framework
much influenced by Aristotelian thought itself influenced by the later Neoplatonic tradition.
The texts of the PA include (i) The Theology ofAristotle, ed. 'Abdulrrahman Badawi in Plotinus
apud arabes/ljlii(fn 'inda '/-'arab, Cairo, 1955, and translated into English by Geoffrey Lewis in
Plotini opera II, Paris/Bruxelles 1959, on the basis of Lewis's unpublished edition and translation his in: A Re-examination of the so-called, Theology of Aristotle', D. Phil., Oxford University
1950; (ii) The Treatise on Div ine Knowledge, ed. Paul Kraus published by Georg C. Anawati,
O.P., in: ,Le Neoplatonisme dans la pensee musulmane: etat actuel des recherche", in: Acta
Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, Roma 198 (1974), 339-405; translations available in Plotini
opera II; Arabic text also published by Badawi in: Plotinus apud arabes, 165-183; (iii) The
Sayings of the Greek Wiseman, in: Lewis, Re-examination, for which Oxford Bodleian Marsh
MS 539 was used; translations in: Plotini opera II; a portion of the Arabic texts are published
by Badawi in: Plotinus apud arabes, 395-99. For further information on the PA, see Peter
Adamson, The Arabic Plotinus. A Philosophical Study of the Theology of Aristotle, London 2002;
and Maroun Aouad, ,La Theologie d' Aristote et autres textes du Plotinus arabus", in:
Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques, ed. Richard Goulet, Paris 1989, Vol. I, 541-90.
5
William Hasker, ,Creation and conservation, religious doctrine of", in: Edward Craig
(Ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, London 1998, Retrieved August 19, 2011 , from
http:/ / 0-www.rep.routledge.com.libus.csd. m u.edu/ article/KG 12SECT3
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beginning', but he sustains (,conserves') it by his power at each moment of its
existence; without God's support it would instantly collapse into nothingness." 6
Let us call this notion creation 1 or Abrahamic creation and stipulate that it
involves a single primary cause or First Cause originating all reality other than
itself by bringing forth all ex nihilo as ontologically after absolute nothingness in
an action somehow including freedom, will and choice such that there is neither
external nor internal necessity compelling creation 1• In this the primary cause
acts with freedom and in no way whatsoever needs to originate things, nor was it
required to originate them by its intrinsic nature or formal constitution.
In its Latin translation the LDC is clearly understood by the translator and
the subsequent Latin tradition as a creationist account of some kind. In chapter 3
the First Cause is said to create the being of soul through the mediation of
intelligence (causa prima creavit esse animae mediante intelligentia). 7 In chapter 4,
being (esse) is described as the first of created things (prima rerum creatarum)
and to be after (post causam primam) but near to the First Cause which is
described as pure being and one. Created being is identified with the intelligence
in chapter 4 and as the first created thing created by the First Cause (primum
creatum quod creatum est a causa prima) in 6/ some Latin manuscripts 7. 8 In
15/16 first created being (ens creatum primum) is again intelligence and is called
created and second being (ens secundum creatum) in relation to the First
Creating Being (ens primum creans). In 8/9 - which is not dependent on Prod us
but rather Plotinus in the Plotinana Arabica - the Latin has the First Cause
creating all things ( creans omnes res) but again creating the intelligence without
mediation and soul and nature through the mediation of the intelligence ( creans
intelligentiam absque media et creans animam et naturam et reliquas res, mediante
intelligentia). In 14/15 first created being as intelligence is infinite but First
Creating Being is the first pure infinite (ens autem primum creans est infinitum
primum purum) and even above infinity (ens primum creans est supra infinitum).
In 17/18 the First Being is motionless and the cause of causes (ens primum est
quietum et est causa causarum) giving being to all things ( dat omnibus rebus ens)
through the mode of creation (per modum creationis), while others such as
intelligence give to things not through the mode of creation but through the
mode of form (non per modum creation is immo per modum formae). In 19/20 the
6

Ibid.
For the Latin text of the LDC I and elsewhere in this article follow the edition of Adrian Pattin, ,Le Liber de causis. Edition etablie a l'aide de 90 manuscrits avec introduction et
notes", in: Tijdschrift v oor Filosofie 28 (1966) 90-203, as corrected in Richard C. Taylor,
,Remarks on the Latin Text and the Translator of the Kalam fi mahd al-khair/ Liber de causis",
in: Bulletin de Philosophie Medievale 31 (1989) , 75-102. This revised text is printed in Albertus
Magnus, De causis et processu univ ersitatis a prima causa, ed. Winfried Fauser, Cologne 1995
[Opera omnia 17, 2] .
8
In some Latin manuscripts the text of 4 is split into 4/ 5 with the result that the Latin
manuscripts of the LDC have totals of 31 or 32 chapters or propositions with explication. The
extant Arabic versions have just 31.
7
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First Cause governs things without mixing with them (res creatas omnes praeter
quod commisceatur cum eis) and emanates on them the power of life and
goodnesses ( injluit super eas virtutem vitae et bonitates). In 21/22 what is merely
self-sufficient is not able to create another thing (non potest creare aliquid aliud),
while the First Cause is above the complete and perfect and creates things and
emanates goodnesses ( creans reset injluens bonitates). In 22/23 God governs (regens [ ... ] est deus) as the Creator of the intelligence, the first created (primum
creatum), governs all through the governance of the intelligence (res, quae
recipiunt regimen intelligentiae, recipiunt regimen creatoris intelligentiae). In 23/24
the First Cause is in things as the First Creating Cause ( causam primam
creantem). In 28/29 simple self-subsistent substances are said to be created
without time ( creata sine tempore), while others are created in time (creata in
tempore) and still others are between these as sempiternal substances with time
(substantiae sempiternae cum tempore). And, finally, at the end of the final chapter, 31/32, all unity after the true one is said to be acquired and created ( omnis
unitas post unum verum est acquisita, creata), while the Pure True One is the
Creator of unitities, causing them to be acquired but not itself an acquired unity
(unum verum purum est creans unitates, faciens acquirere, non acquisitum). There
the Pure Entity (ens purum) is also the cause of generated temporal things and of
all things eternal. While the first chapter explained the dependence of all on the
primary cause, the last chapter establishes the existence of one primary cause
through this argument from unity.
The purpose of this brief study is to advance some precisions regarding the
nature of divine causality as discussed in the original Arabic text of the LD C 9
and to provide some clarifications regarding the meanings of creation in this
work. The need for this is prompted by several important considerations of
which I now note just two. First, in the account of Hasker quoted above, eman ation as necessary and the absence of decision willed and free are listed as
characteristics separating emanation from creation,. Yet in the Arabic LDC the
language of emanation is present and directly connected with abda'a ( creare) on
the part of al-mubdi' (the Creator). What is more, no discussion of will, choice
or decision is found in the Arabic LDC. Second, as mentioned earlier, the p rimary source of most of the reasoning of the LDC is derived from selected propositions of the Elements of Theology of the Neoplatonist Proclus, while the presence of the thought of Plotinus can be detected directly in chapter 8 (Latin 8/ 9)

9

My concern here is with the traditional version of the LDC known in Arabic as either
, The Discourse on the Pure Good" (Kalam fz mal}t;i al-khair) or ,The Book of Aristotle's
Expostion on the Pure Good" (Kitab al-zt;liil} li-Aris(Ufiills fz al-khair al-mal}(l} . The so-called
,De causis II' is not considered here. Regarding that text, see Pierre Thillet and Saleh
Oudaimah, , Proclus Arabe. In nouveau Liber de causis?", in: Bulletin d'Etudes Orientales [I nstitut fran~ais d'Etudes arabes de Damas] 53-54 (2001-2) 293-368. Also see the recent study of
al-'AmirT by Elvira Wakelnig, Feder, Tafel, Mensch. Al-'Amirls Kitab al-Fu~iil fT l-Ma'alim alilahTya und die arabische Proklos-Rezeption, Leiden/Boston, 2006.
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and indirectly elsewhere, albeit as this thought is found in the PA. But
Neoplatonic philosophical thought is distinctly cited by Hasker as indicative of a
rejection of creation 1• In light of these considerations, the vocabulary chosen by
the Latin translator, and the extensive use of the LDC as a creationist work by
thinkers of the subsequent Latin tradition, it is clear there is a need for study of
this work and the meaning of its vocabulary and philosophical assertions in its
Arabic context for the determination of the larger considerations both of
whether, pace Hasker, emanationism and creation in this work are in fact
compatible under some definition of creation and of whether the author of the
LDC may have intended to assert that compatibility.
In what follows here I first provide an account of chapter 1 of the Arabic
LDC and Proclus on primary and secondary causality. Second, I consider the
pseudonymous author's account of agency using the Arabic fi'l (act, actus) and
related forms from its triliteral root f '-l together with his account of abda'a and
various forms of the triliteral root b-d-' which were translated into Latin as
creator, creatio, creare, creans, creatum and related forms. Here I argue that the
LDC has in fact a notion of creation, but one that is distinct from that of the
Abrahamic traditions. Third, I consider a chapter of the LDC which seems to
indicate that the author of the LDC made no such distinction. Finally, I
conclude with a summary of what has been accomplished and remarks on the
author's apparent conflation of the philosophical notion of ibdii' and the
religious notion of creation 1 in the context of the project of introducing
philosophical principles and reasoning developed from Proclus and Plotinus into
the cultural and developing scientific context of Islam in Ninth century
Baghdad.

1. Primary and Secondary Causality
The Elements of Theology of the Fifth century Athenian Neoplatonist Proclus is
the source on which the Arabic LDC draws for its account of primary and
secondary causality prominent in its opening chapter. It is precisely in Propositions 56 and 57 that Proclus argues for the intrinsic causal presence of the
transcendent One or Good in all that is below it, even to the point of asserting
that privation of form is from the Good. 10 The transcendence of the One and
the multiple levels of hierarchical intermediate realities set forth by Proclus
would seem necessarily to indicate a distance so great that the involvement of
the One becomes less and less at the lower levels of what proceeds from the One
to the point of being absent or nearly so at the lowest level. Instead, argues Proclus, in the case of any effect, insofar as the very being of a secondary cause in
10

Prod us, Elements of Theology, ed. & tr. E. R. Dodds, Oxford 1963, Prop. 57, 56.15-16.
Hereafter, Proclus, ET 1963.
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the emanative hierarchy is owed to a prior cause, it owes to the prior cause also
all that it produces by the power of production that it has arising from its own
being or existence.
PROP. 56: , All that is produced by secondary beings is in a greater measure
produced from those prior and more determinative principles from which the
secondary were themselves derived.
For if the secondary has its whole existence from its prior, thence also it receives
its power of further production, since productive powers reside in producers in
virtue of their existence and form part of their being. But if it owes to the superior cause its power of production, to that superior it owes its character as a
cause in so far as it is a cause, a character meted out to it from thence in propo rtion to its constitutive capacity. If so, the things which proceed from it are
caused in virtue of its prior; for the same principle which makes the one a cause
makes the other an effect. If so, the effect owes to the superior cause its character as an effect.
Again, it is evident that the effect is determined by the superior principle in a
greater measure. For if the latter has conferred on the secondary being the
causality which enabled it to produce, it must itself have possessed this causality
primitively (prop. 18), and it is in virtue of this that the secondary being generates, having derived from its prior the capacity of secondary generation. But if the
secondary is productive by participation, the primal primitively and by communication, the latter is causative in a greater measure, inasmuch as it has
communicated to another the power of generating consequents." 11
Here Proclus responds to the concern of the distance of the One from the
lowest of effects with the principle that the totality of what any secondary (or
tertiary or later) cause is or has must be recognized as due to the primary cau se,
that is, not only the being of the secondary or later cause but also its very power
to be productive of anything else or to carry out any activity must be traced to
the primary cause. As a consequence, the primary cause, seemingly more causally
distant, in fact is more causally present (,the effect owes to the superior cause its
character as an effect") insofar as no secondary or later cause can exist or act of
itself without reference to the primary cause which makes it a reality.
Then he completes the account of principles of primary and secondary
causality in Proposition 57 stressing the priority of the primary cause as cause of
the secondary and necessarily cooperative in the action of the secondary. The
primary cause, then, is primary because it had within its very self already the p ower to bring about the secondary and all that the secondary causes and because it
is the causal origin of- or simply cause of- the secondary cause's existence and
power to be causally efficacious in reference to some third thing in the hierarchy.

11

120

Proclus, ET 1963, 55.

Primary Causality and ibdii' ( creare) in the Liber de causis

PROP. 57: ,Every cause both operates prior to its consequent and gives rise to a
greater number ofposterior terms.
For if it is a cause, it is more perfect and more powerful than its consequent
(prop. 7). And if so, it must cause a greater number of effects: for greater power
produces more effects, equal power, equal effects, and lesser power, fewer; and
the power which can produce the greater effects upon a like subject can produce
also the lesser, whereas a power capable of the lesser will not necessarily be
capable of the greater. If, then, the cause is more powerful than its consequent, it
is productive of a greater number of effects.
But again, the powers which are in the consequent are present in a greater
measure in the cause. For all that is produced by secondary beings is produced in
a greater measure by prior and more determinative principles (prop. 56). The
cause, then, is cooperative in the production of all that the consequent is capable
of producing.
And if it first produces the consequent itself, it is of course plain that it is operative before the latter in the activity which produces it. Thus every cause operates
both prior to its consequent and in conjunction with it, and likewise gives rise to
further effects posterior to it [ ... J." 12
What is involved here in Proclus is a metaphysical hierarchy of productive
per se causes, not a series of causes such as the production of a child by a parent
with those parents caused or produced by their parents, and so forth. In the
metaphysical hierarchy discussed here the activity of the lowest requires the
actual and continuous presence of the causal activity of all those causes prior in
the hierarchy all the way to the first cause in the hierarchy. Note that were the
involvement of any one of those causes in the hierarchy to be absent, both the
existence and the causal efficacy of everything below that missing link would fail.
However, that is not to say that in the sequential production of A, B, and C, were B to be removed, A would not have the power to produce C. Proclus reasons
that, if A has sufficient power to produce in existence B and the power belonging
to B enabling it to produce C, then A has sufficient power to produce C in the
absence of B. That is, in principle the power to produce C has to be conceded to
be present in A. 13 In that way A is the primary cause in the series ABC in a way
Proclus, ET 1963, 55-57. I omit the last portion of the text which Dodds rightly
indicates to be a corollary applying the principles to Soul and Intelligence. The LDC does not
draw on the corollary.
13
This proposition contains the principles of primary causality. However, in practice in
the graduated course of the hierarchy the lower is weaker and has more plurality than the higher. Consequently, when this is applied to the hierarchy of beings in the LDC the First Cause
must first originate or cause only the first effect, the Intellect - which is the first originated
being- and only through mediation of Intellect does it originate other things. Hence, in the
LDC the First Cause is the sole originator of things and sole giver of being to things, but it
cannot do so for other things below Intellect without the mediation of Intellect and other higher realities such as Soul and Nature, as mentioned in LDC chapter 8 which is discussed below.
That is, while A has the power to originate C, it can do so only through B. Hence, while the
12
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that is not open to B or any other number of intermediaries between A and C.
In Proposition 70 Prod us makes it clear that this analysis applies not only to the
causation of distinct things but also to the causation of the intrinsic constituents
of any thing.
PROP. 70: , All those more universal characters which inhere in the originative
principles both irradiate their participants before the specific characters and are
slower to withdraw from a being which has once shared in them.
For the higher cause begins its operation upon secondary beings before its
consequent, and is present concomitantly with the presence of the latter, and is
still present and operative when the consequent has ceased to operate; and this is
true not only in respect of the range of objects affected (prop. 57) but in regard
to each several contingent participant. Thus, for example, a thing must exist
before it has life, and have life before it is human. And again, when the logical
faculty has failed it is no longer human, but it is still a living thing, since it
breathes and feels; and when life in turn has abandoned it existence remains to it,
for even when it ceases to live it still has being. So in every case. The reason is
that the higher cause, being more efficacious (prop. 56), operates sooner upon
the participant (for where the same thing is affected by two causes it is affected
first by the more powerful); and in the activity of the secondary the higher is cooperative, because all the effects of the secondary are concomitantly generated
by the more determinative cause; and where the former has withdrawn the latter
is still present (for the gift of the more powerful principle is slower to abandon
the participant, being more efficacious, and also inasmuch as through the gift of
its consequent it has made its own irradiation stronger)." 14
According to the example in the text of Proclus, this does not mean that
human life can be produced without the presence of both being and living, but
rather only that the formal characteristic of being is required for the presence of
life and that the withdrawal of the formal characteristic of life would not entail
the withdrawal of being. However, the withdrawal of being would entail the
withdrawal of the posterior formal characteristic of life since being is caused first
in the thing by the primary cause. The editor and translator of the Elements of
Theology by Proclus, E. R. Dodds, indicates this with his parenthetical references
to earlier propositions and thereby shows how Proclus intends to draw upon
those to establish here that the very condition of existence that makes all other
characteristics possible must be traced back to the primary cause alone. The primary cause is the only causal principle that can provide the condition of
existence required for the effect (the third) and also the complete constitution of
the secondary cause.

LDC argues that the First Cause is the sole originator, it does not argue that it is the sole cause
of the plurality of entities in the hierarchy and of the plurality of individuals within any species.
14
Proclus, ET 1963, 66-67.
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For Proclus the purpose of these propositions was to draw attention to the
need to think the causal presence of the One in each and every thing posterior to
it. Again, to emphasize the key point in this account of primary and secondary
causality, in the analysis of any effect in a hierarchy of three or more, the activity
of the second upon the third is based on the being and the power of causal
activity belonging to the second. But the second (as well as the third and any
subsequent others) is ontologically dependent in every way upon the causal
activity of the first. That is, in addition to the existence of the second owed to
the first, the very being of the power of activity on the part of the second to
bring about the third or anything in it is owed in an ontologically prior way to
the first, the primary cause.
The author of the Arabic LDC brought together these three propositions
from Proclus to form in his own way a basic account of primary and secondary
causality in the first chapter of this work which sets the theme of the entire
work, though it does so in terms of the principles functioning in the
metaphysical doctrine of primary causality and without a single mention in the
first chapter of the LDC of the vocabulary of abda 'a (creare).

Chapter <1 >
,Every primary cause emanates more abundantly on its effect than does the universal second cause. And when the universal second cause removes its power
from the thing, the universal first cause does not remove its power from it. For
the universal first cause acts on the effect of the second cause before the universal second cause which is immediately adjacent to (the effect) acts on (the
effect). So when the second cause which is immediately adjacent to the effect
acts, its act is not able to do without the first cause which is above (the second
cause). And when the second (cause) separates itself from the effect which is
immediately adjacent to it, the first cause which is above (the second cause) does
not separate itself from (the effect), because it is cause of (the effect's) cause.
The first cause, therefore, is more the cause of the thing than its proximate cause
which is immediately adjacent to (the thing).
As examples of that we give being, living and man, for the thing must first
be a being, then living, then a man. Thus, living is the proximate cause of the
man and being is his remote cause. Being, then, is more a cause of the man than
living because (being) is a cause of living which is a cause of the man. Likewise,
when you make rationality a cause of the man, being is more a cause of the man
than rationality because (being) is a cause of (rationality's) cause. The proof is
that, when you remove the rational faculty from the man, it does not continue a
man but it does continue living, breathing and sensitive. And when you remove
living from it, it does not continue living but it does continue being, because
being is not removed from it when living is removed. Because the cause is not
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removed with the removal of its effect, the man 15 continues being. When the individual is not a man, it is an animal; and when it is not an animal, it is only a
being.
So it has become clear and evident that the remote first cause is more
encompassing and more a cause of the thing than its proximate cause. On
account of that, its act has come to be more strongly adherent to the thing than
the act of (the thing's) proximate cause. This came to be so only because the
thing is first acted on by the remote power, then secondly it is acted on by the
power which is below the first. <Moreover>, the first cause aids the second
cause in its act because every act which the second cause effects, the first cause
also effects, except that (the first cause) effects it in another, transcendent and
more sublime manner. And when the second cause separates itself from its
effect, the first cause does not separate itself from it because the act of the first
cause is mightier and more strongly adherent to the thing than the act of its
proximate cause. Furthermore, the effect of the second cause has been made
stable only through the power of the first cause. For, when the second cause effects a thing, the first cause which is above (the second cause) emanates on that
thing from its power so that it strongly adheres to that thing and conserves it.
Thus, it has become clear and evident that the remote first cause is more a cause
of the thing than its proximate cause which is immediately adjacent to (the
thing) and that it emanates its power on it and conserves it and does not separate
itself from it with the separation of its proximate cause, but rather it remains in
it and strongly adheres to it in accordance with what we have made clear and evident. " 16
The opening proposition of the LDC, then, consists in a restatement of the
accounts of primary and secondary causality found in propositions 56, 57 and 70
of the Elements of Theology by Proclus. Applied to caused entities of the world
this doctrine asserts simply that in the reality of any caused thing in a hierarchy
of per se causes the first cause is present and more causally efficacious with
regard to any effect than is any intermediate cause. That doctrine is also applied
here with regard to the intrinsic constituents of any caused items as well, since
rationality is only possible in what is living and living is only possible in what
exists. The very existence that is causally traced solely to the primary cause is a
necessary prerequisite in the constitution of living existence and rational

15

Proclus is more precise here by not specifying man as the subject after the removal of
rationality than is the author of the LDC since the latter speaks of the man from whom
rationality and other essential characteristics of what it is to be a man have been removed.
16
This and other translations of the Arabic LDC in this article are substantially revised
versions of that found in my edition and study of the Arabic LDC in Richard C. Taylor, The
Liber de causis (Kalam fi mat:u;l al-khair): A Study of Medieval Neoplatonism, Doctoral Dissertation, University of Toronto 1981. I also draw on some of the analyses of philosophical
vocabulary in that work, though the interpretation presented in this article is distinctively different. I provide the referents of pronouns in parentheses in the translation.
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existence. The nature of this causal dependence later in the LDC is expressed in
terms of emanation, something hardly surprising given its Neoplatonic source.
Its expression is also framed with the terminology of agency with the
employment of the Arabic rootf-'-1 as act (fi'l), effect (maful), to act (fa'ala intransitive), to act on (fa'ala fz), to effect or bring about (fa'ala transitive), and
the passive to be acted on by (infa'ala min). What is more, in this context being
(al-annryah, esse) is not specified as itself a thing, a form or even an act in its own
right; rather, it is only a term used to denominate the consequence of an act
caused by the primary cause, an act which is also a necessary condition for
anything to exist, namely, that it has been caused by the primary cause in a
hierarchy of causes. In this first chapter of the LDC the term annryah for
,being' or ,existence' is not a technical term nor is it associated with any
distinction of essence and existence because the author's purpose here is only to
spell out in detail the nature of the doctrine of primary causality. Since the term
is used to indicate dependence on a primary cause, one could as easily have used
the term ,actuality' to say that the actuality of any second or later cause,
including the actuality of its powers, in a hierarchy of primary causality depends
on one first cause. 17 And, again, in this first proposition none of the vocabulary
of abda 'a (ereare) is found.
The account in Liber de causis chapter 1, then, is purely one of primary and
secondary causality with its focus on the explanation of the presence in every
effect of the causality of the primary cause in any causal hierarchy that begins
with a single productive primary cause. (The proof that there is one primary
cause as ,the First True One" is found in the closing chapter of the LDC which
provides the argumentative validation of the account of primary causality
explicated in the opening chapter.) Consequently, it is not surprising that the
doctrine of primary causality expressed here is one to which many philosophers
ascribe in general import, among them Plotinus, Proclus, the author of the LDC,
al-Kindi, al-Farabi, Avicenna, and many other philosophical and theological
thinkers of the Greek, Arabic and Latin traditions. Nothing in reality escapes the
causal presence of the First Cause in this teaching on primary and secondary
causality. 18

17

On the notion of actuality in Plotinus and the Plotiniana Arabica with particular reference to Enneads 6.8, see Richard C. Taylor, ,Aquinas, the Plotiniana Arabica, and the
Metaphysics of Being and Actuality", in: journal of the History of Ideas 59 (1998), 217-239,
particularly 234-238.
18
Even the contingent actions on the part of things of the sublunar realm which are not
necessitated are nevertheless traced to the First Cause as primary cause regardless of what
contingent alternative action comes about. In this sense primary causality need not be
understood to undermine free choice and moral responsibility for human beings.
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2. fa'ala (agere) and abda'a (creare) in the LDC
Throughout the LDC forms of fa'ala (to act: intransitive; to effect: transitive) ,
fa'ala fz (to act on) and infa'ala (to be acted on: chapter 1 only) are found
corresponding to forms of the Greek poiein, paschein, and energein I energeia. 19
The term fii'il (agent) occurs a number of times and is used in chapter 19 to
denote the First Cause as a true agent (fii'ilun l}aqqun) because it acts
immediately in virtue of its own being (bi-annfyati-hi), without there being any
intermediary (waslatun) or addition (ziyiidatan) between it and its effect. Proposition 122 of Proclus -on which chapter 19 is based- concerns governance, scil.
providence, on the part of divine beings, the gods. The author of the LDC transforms it into an account of the governance of the First Cause and writes, ,The
First Cause governs over all originated things (al-ashyii'a al-mubtada 'ta kulla-hii:
note the form from the root b-d- ') without mixing with them." He later adds,
, [T]he First Cause is eternally stable and subsistent in its pure unity and governs
over all originated things [ ... ] For the First Good emanates goodnesses on all
things in a single emanation, except that every one of the things receives of that
emanation in accordance with its power and its being (annfyati-hi). The First
Good emanates goodnesses on all things in a single manner because it is
goodness - through its being, its entity and its power (bi-annfyati-hi wahuwfyati-hi wa-quwati-hi) -only inasmuch as it is goodness, and goodness and
entity ( al-huwryah are a single thing. " 21
The author draws on Proclus but then goes on to provide his own accou nt
of the issue of true action and primary causality in a summary after the lines
directly dependent on Proclus. 22 There the author introduces a notion of

ro

19
20

See Taylor, The Liber de causis, 342-3.
In the LDC there is no clear distinction between huw ryah/ ens/entity and annryah/ esse/

being.
21

LDC 19. Taylor, The Liber de causis, Arabic 221-223; English 315 (revised).
In the final half of the chapter, the author follows Proclus only in the first two
sentences. ,We resume and say, then, that for every agent which acts solely through its being
there is no intermediary and no other thing intermediate between it and its effect. What is
intermediary between the agent and the effect is only an addition to the being: I mean that,
w hen the agent acts through an instrument, it does not act through its being and its being is composite. So for that reason the recipient <in that case> receives through a intermediary between it and
its agent; and the agent is then distinct from its act and does not govern with authentic and
pervasive governance. As for the agent w hich is such that between it and its act there is no
intermediary at all, the agent <here> is a true agent and a true governor which effects things w ith
the utmost of thoroughness beyond which there can be no other thoroughness <of greater degree>
and which governs its act with the utmost of governance. For it governs over the thing in the
manner in which it acts, and it acts only through its entity, so <through> its entity it also gov erns
it. Due to that it has come to govern and to act with the utmost of precision and governance in
which there is no variation and no deviation. And the acts and governance on the part of the first
causes are variegated only according to the merit of the recipient." Emphasis added to indicate
what is not from Proclus. Taylor, The Liber de causis, Arabic 221-222; English, 315 (revised).
22
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thoroughly pervasive governance to the utmost degree implying that this
penetrates through all things. That this governance takes place without instrument and immediately in virtue of the being of the First Cause makes this agent
a true agent that by the very act of its being is ,a true agent and a true governor
which effects (yafalu, makes, brings about) things with the utmost of
thoroughness beyond which there can be no other thoroughness <of greater
degree> and which directs its act with the utmost of governance." Like primary
causality, through its one and only act which is not distinct from its being the
First Cause's governing action penetrates to all things, while any governance or
providential action involving an instrument is one in which the agent is distinct
from its act and unable to exercise authentic ( $:Z/:ffl):m) governance.
This notion of true agency on the part of the First Cause also appears in the
PA numerous times. For example, in the Theology of Aristotle we find, ,The
intellect[ ... ] is the first act of the One True Agent". 23 In the Sayings of the Greek
Wiseman the author writes that the First Agent is also the cause of the entity
(huwryah) of soul through the mediation of the intelligence. Furthermore, the
First does not act through a form of its own, for in the PA and in chapter 8 (8/9)
of the LDC the First is said to be without form (~rah, /Jilyah) and to be ,only
being", (annfyah faqaf} 24 Similar to what is found in LDC 19, in the Sayings of
the Greek Wiseman we find that ,The First Agent is a complete (tiimmatun)
cause, for it is the cause of the entity (huwfyah) and form ( $Urah) of the thing
without intermediary." Here the intelligence is said to be a cause of things below
it but ,it is not a complete cause of the thing because it is only the cause of the
thing's form, not the cause of entity." 25 As Peter Adamson notes, in the Sayings
of the Greek Wiseman the notion of will (al-iriidah) on the part of the First
Cause is rejected because it would not then act in virtue of its own being (biannfyati-hi), while the first effect, the intellect, acts through knowing which is a
condition for willing. Rather, ,will does not precede the act of the First Agent
23

PA Theology of Aristotle, ed. Badawi, 95.16-17; Lewis tr., 469 n. 27. See Adamson, The
Arabic Plotinus, 191-192; and Peter Adamson,Al-Kindi, Oxford, 2007,57-62.
24
PA Sayings, ed. Badawi, 185.12-13; Lewis tr., 281, n. 14. This language is also in the
Proclus Arabus texts edited by Gerhard Endress in Proclus Arabus. Zwanzig Abschnitte aus der
Institutio Theologica in arabischer Ubersetzung, Wiesbaden 1973, with the First Cau se called
,only being" (ann"iyah faqatJ and ,only entity" (huwryah faqat) as free of qualities and attributes and is said to produce all things as First Agent. Proclus Arabus, 72.4-9. At Proclus Arabus,
21.30-38 we find, "If this is as we have mentioned, then it has been proven correct that there
things are which are not material but rather only forms, and that there another thing is which
has no matter and no form atall, but rather is only entity (huwryah faqat). This is the True
One above whom there is nothing else and who is the Cause of causes. It has been made plain
also by what we mentioned that the things are divided into three divisions. For either the
thing is matter with form, so that its being is formal and material; or the thing is a form only,
so that its being is formal, not material; or the thing is being only, so that its being is neither
material nor formal. This <latter> is the First Cause above whom there is no other cause, as
we have said and made evident above." Emphasis added. My translation.
25
PA Sayings, Badawi, 185.4-19, Lewis tr., 281, nn. 105-111. My translations here.
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because (the First Agent) acts by its being alone (bi-anni-hi faqat) ."26 The text in
the Sayings of the Greek Wiseman then goes on to stress that the First Agent
does not wish (lam yaridu) the origination of intellect such that it comes about
after an act of will (al-iradah) because there was no willing (al-iriidah) preceding
its act. Rather, it would be a sign of deficiency for there to be will (al-iradah)
between it and its product (baina-hu wa baina mafuli-hi) since it doe not go
from one action to another but instead ,originates things all at once (ibtada'a-hii
dafatan wahidatan). "27 It is above substance, intellect and sight, yet in its
complete unity ,it sees and knows its own essence (dhata-hu) which is the essence above all essences" and it is itself ,the knowledge above every knowledge
because it is the First Knowledge" and not like the knowledge that is in some s econd that needs knowledge of a first substance before it. A similar description of
the First is also found in LDC 8 where the First Cause is said to be ,above
intelligence, soul and nature because it is the Originator of all things." There
Divine Knowledge (al- 'ilm al-iliihfy) is attributed to it and is asserted to be
unlike that of intellect or soul because it is the Originator of every knowledge. 28
These texts from the PA and LDC chapter 19 are clearly connected in meaning
and vocabulary. The notion that the First acts immediately in virtue of its very
being, a key principle of Neoplatonism, 29 is found in each and it is this which
distinguishes the First from the intelligence according to both Arabic sources. In
the PA the author connects these considerations with will (al-iriidah) and rejects
will as an attribute of the First, while in LDC 19 will (al-iradah) is not
mentioned. In fact, will does not occur at all in the entire LDC, although a verb
from the same root does occur in LDC chapter 22. There the author writes
paraphrasing and modifying Prod us, Elements of Theology, Proposition 122, ,the
things which the governance of the intelligence does not reach, the governance
of the Originator of the intelligence (mubdi'i al- 'aqli, Latin creatoris
intelligentiae) already reaches. For nothing whatsoever escapes His 30 governance
26

Adamson, The Arabic Plotinus, 132. PA Sayings, Badawi 1955,174.
PA Sayings, Badawi 1955, 174.0-175.16; Lewis tr., 321-323, ## 105-120. My translations here.
28
Taylor, The Liber de causis, Arabic 178-179, English 299 (revised).
29
Detailed discussion of this profoundly important notion of causality auto to einai is
beyond the parameters of this article. For a valuable discussion, see Cristina D'Ancona Costa,
,Plotinus and later Platonic philosophers on the causality of the First Principle", in: The
Cambridge Companion to Plotinus, ed. Lloyd P. Gerson, Cambridge 1996, Cambridge
Collections online, 15. September 2011. DOl: 10.1017/CCOL0521470935.016 356-385, esp.
365-367. D' Ancona Costa also discussed this notion in the LDC in her article, ,La doctrine
neoplatonicienne de l'etre entre l'antiquite tardive et le moyen age. Le Liber de causis par rapport a ses sources," in her: Recherches sur le Liber de causis, Paris 1995, 121-153, especially 146153, where she argues that the LDC is influenced by the writings of the pseudo-Dionysius. If
that is the case, it raises the question of Divine freedom in the ps.-Dionysius, an issue beyond
the limits of this article. However, it remains that Divine freedom of will and the possibility of
a refraining from emanative creative causality is not found in the LDC.
30
The issue of pronoun gender in the LDC is peculiar to chapter 22 where the First
27
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because He wishes (yurfdu, Latin vult) all things to attain His goodness at once
(ma'an). For not everything yearns for the intelligence and is eager to attain it,
while all things do yearn for the First Good and are avidly eager to attain Him.
That no one doubts!" 3 1
The middle sentence of this quotation, ,For nothing [ ... ] at once", has no
corresponding text in the Elements of the Theology,whilethe sentence immediately preceding it and that immediately following it do have corresponding
texts in Proclus. 32 Hence, this is a remark added by the author. Yet, if the author
of the LDC wished to state something distinctive about divine will, there are
more than enough opportunities for such a thing to be said directly and with the
use of iradah (will) or other related forms. For these reasons and because it
would contradict the teaching on the First as acting by its being alone or
through its very being, I decline to see in the case of yur'idu - which is from the
same triliteral root as iradah, r-w-d - a need to translate it as ,it wills' and instead
render it as ,it wishes' to indicate that the governance of the First Cause and
First Originator as the Good is meant at once to extend to all reality by the action of its very being which is not distinct from its essence. Consequently, there
is no mention or reference to divine will or divine choice of any sort in the LDC.
In fact, on the basis of the discussion of the activity of the First Cause as taking
place by its very being (bi-ann'iyati-hi, bi-anni-hi), the common doctrine here is
that the existence or positing of the First Cause immediately and necessarily without intermediate act or temporal pause of any sort- realizes the existence or
positing of the first caused thing, the Intellect, sometimes itself called the first
being in the sense of first originated after the First. The First is also said in the
PA Sayings of the Greek Wiseman to be pure cause and above both natural and
volitional necessity of which it is the cause with the result that the emanation
from it is above the categories of nature or will. 33
The root b-d-' in the fourth form (causative) is found as mubdi' in the texts
discussed immediately above and I have chosen to render it for the present as
,originator". The eighth form (reflective or passive) occurs as well, as a participle
for a thing originated in the passive, mubtada' or the originator in the active,
mubtadi'. 34 These forms the Latin translator chose not unreasonably to render
with forms of creare, to create, as indicated in the beginning of this article by my
summary of the use of forms of creare in the LDC. In the Arabic LDC, as in the
Cause is identified with Allah, God. This is discussed below in section 3.
31
LDC 22. Taylor, The Liber de causis, Arabic 23 7-38; English 319-20 (substantially
revised). Proclus, ET 1963, 108-109.
32
Cf. Taylor, The Liber de causis, 1981 , 238.
33
Taylor, The Liber de causis, 365: Oxford Marsh 539 f.24vl3-25r8. The text, translated
by Lewis (see n. 4 above) in Plotini opera II, 237, ## 62-63, is discussed in Adamson, The
Arabic Plotinus, 147 ff. Also see Peter Adamson, ,A note on Freedom in the Circle of alKindi", in: 'Abbasid Studies: Occasional Papers of the School of'Abbasid Studies, Cambridge, 6-10
july 2002, Leuven/Dudley, Mass. 2003, 199-207, especially 202 sqq.
34
No forms from the root b-d- ' appear in the Proclus Arabus texts edited by Endress.
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PA, these forms are used to indicate the bringing to existence of something by
an act of the First Cause, an act deemed to be described by use of this
terminology solely in reference to the primary causality of the First Cause. In
the LDC at chapter 17 it is said that the First Entity (al-huwryah al-ula) which is
the Cause of causes alone gives entity (huwryah) to all things by the mode of
origination (ibdac).
,We resume and say, then, that the First Entity is quiescent and is the
Cause of causes, and if it gives all things entity, it gives it in the manner of
origination. The first life gives life to what is below, not in the manner of
origination, but in the manner of form (bi-nawci ${iratin). And, likewise, the
intelligence gives knowledge and the other things to what is below it only in the
manner of form, not in the manner of origination (bi-nawci ibdacin), because the
manner of origination belongs to the First Cause alone. ccJs
In light of these texts, the causality of origination in the PA and the LDC
seems to be distinctively different from that of creation 1 -if Hasker's account is
accepted - for the origination of reality as described here is without will and
takes place immediately upon the positing of the First Cause without pause of
any sort and without any action additional to the being of the First Cause.
Hence, the teaching of the LDC can be reasonably be said to be in accord with
that of Proclus and also Plotinus in reference to the issue of primary causality. It
involves an emanation from higher to lower which must be immediate upon the
assertion or existence of the cause. Certainly such causality is beyond both that
of nature which involves motion and change and that of form and what is
entailed by form as necessity of nature and also beyond that of necessity by
some extrinsic compulsion. Let us call extrinsic compulsion necessity 3 and what
follows on the basis of the nature or form of a thing necessity2.• Yet, insofar as it
involves the immediate positing of the effect upon the positing of the cause, this
too is a kind of necessity albeit surely of another sort, so let us call it necessity 1
or transcendent necessity. This latter necessity 1 is beyond the nature of will
where will might denote deliberation, choice, or weighing of alternatives,
characteristics of human will and action. It then does not involve a selection
between alternatives with respect to the emanation of goodness since there is no
will and no deliberation. Rather, reality under necessity 1 involves what cannot be
otherwise than the overflowing of reality from the First as the Good. 36 This
form of origination or ibdac ( creatio) then, does not allow for the possibility of a
stopping or denial of the emanation of reality from the First. What is more,
since the First Cause has no form it does not act through the necessity of a natu 35

Taylor, The Liber de causis, Arabic 215-216; English 312 (revised).
At the end of LDC 8 the author writes, ,If someone says that it has to have a form
( IJilyah), then we say that its form ( l}ilyah) is infinite and its individual nature is the Pure Good
emanating all goodnesses upon the intellect and upon the rest of the things through the mediation of the intellect." Taylor, The Liber de causis, Arabic 189, English 300 (revised). Since form
involves delimitation the notion of an infinite form is oxymoronic and intentionally so.
36
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re or form but only through its very self, its very being, its very goodness which
are one. To this extent, then, it does not fit under Hasker's conception of creation,, which he characterizes as ,common to the monotheistic religions of
Judaism, Christianity and Islam [ ... ] a free act on God's part; he has no ,need' to
create but has done so out of love and generosity. " 37 If we are to allow this notion of ibda' (creatio) -up to this point called ,origination' in this article - to be
called creation, let us call it for the present creation 2 as emanative origination and
let it be specified that it entails the negation of will, choice, the necessity of nature characteristic of things having nature or form (which is necessity 2 ), and also
external compulsion (which is necessity 3 ). The act that follows immediately
upon the being of the First is the emanation of all reality from it as the Good.
This emanative causality founded on the First as the Good is common to Plotinus, Proclus, the PA, the LDC, al-Farabi, and Avicenna. For each of these it
involves the causing by the primary cause of the existence of something after
nothing as well as a continuous ontological activity of causing upon which all
reality after itself depends. 38
Philosophical support for the view that creation 2 is suitably considered creation tout court can be found in the early writings of a sophisticated reader of the
LDC, Thomas Aquinas. In his first major work, the Commentary on the
Sentences of Peter Lombard (1252-56), at Book 2 d. 1, q. 1, a. 2, resp. Aquinas
writes that:
37

See note 5 above.
Detailed consideration of al-Farabi and Avicenna on this issue as well as careful
consideration of the thought of al-Kindi are beyond the parameters of the present article. I
intend to prepare another study of these issues in their thought on another occasion.
Regarding al-Farabi, see the first two chapters of his On the Perfect State, ed. & tr. Richard
Walzer, Oxford 1985; rpt Chicago 1998. For Avicenna, see The Metaphysics of the Healing, tr.
Michael E. Marmura, Provo, Utah 2005, Book 9, Ch. 6, notably 339, Arabic lines 8-12. Also see
the account of Olga Lizzini in her Fluxus (fayd}. Indagine sui fondamenti della metafisica e della
fisica di Avicenna, Bari 2011, 300-315, and her discussion of the Theology of Aristotle from the
PA, LDC, al-Kindi and al-Farabi as predecessors and sources for Avicenna at 27-69. Although
al-Kindi in his treatise on the True A gent sets out a clear account of primary causality in accord
with Ch. 1 of the LDC, his understanding of Divine creation as willed and as creation in time
separates him from the others listed above. See Adam son, al-Kindi, 46-105, especially 57-71.
But also see Cristina D' Ancona Costa, ,Al-Kindi et !'auteur du Liber de causis", in: Recherches
sur le Liber de causis, 155-194. The account of divine causality and ontological dependence in
Averroes, another major thinker of the Arabic tradition, is quite different and is something I
will address elsewhere. Also see Cristina D'Ancona Costa's ,Avicenna and the Liber de causis:
A contribution to the dossier", in: Revista Espanola de Filosiofia Medievale 7 (2000) 95-114.
Here I add regarding Avicenna to note that at he seems to be discussing the PA, al-Kindi and
perhaps the LDC at Metaphysics 6.2 (Marmura, 203-205) where he provides a definition of
ibdii' and also at Metphysics 9.4 (Marmura, 330-331) where he reasons that ibdii' should not be
restricted to the creative causality of the First Cause alone but rather suitably characterizes the
causality in the emanation of intelligences as each of the higher among these causes the
existence of its immediately lower intelligence by metaphysical agent causality (cf. Metaphysics
6.1, Marmura, 194-195).
38
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,the notion of creation involves two things. The first is that it presupposes
nothing in the thing which is said to be created [ ... ] creation is said to be from
nothing because there is nothing which preexists creation as uncreated. The second is that in the thing which is said to be created non-being is prior to being,
not by a priority of time or duration [ ... ] but by a priority of nature in such a
way that, if the created thing is left to itself, non-being would result. For it has
being only from the influence of a superior cause."
These two criteria are precisely those found in the account of primary
causality in the LDC derived from Proclus and common to the teachings of Plotinus, Proclus, the PA, the LDC, al-Farabi, and Avicenna. What is more, Aquinas
goes on in the same passage to insist that this is creation and has been taught as
such by the philosophers. He writes,
,For those two reasons creation is said to be from nothing in two ways.
One is such that the negation would negate the order of creation in regard to
something preexisting implied by the preposition from (ex), so that (creation)
would be said to be from nothing because it is not from something preexisting.
That is with respect to the first. The other is such that the order of creation in
regard to nothing preexisting would remain affirmed by nature so that creation
would be said to be from nothing because the thing created naturally has nonbeing prior to being. If these two suffice for the notion of creation, then creation
can be demonstrated in this way and in this way the philosophers have asserted
creation. However, if we take a third <consideration> to be required for the
notion of creation so that in duration the thing created has non -being before
being so that it is said to be from nothing because it is temporally after nothing,
creation cannot be demonstrated in this way nor is this conceded by the
philosophers, but is supposed by faith." 39
Here it is clear that Aquinas in this early work with good reason rejects the
understanding much later proposed by Hasker and clearly asserts criteria for the
use of the term ,creation" that fit precisely what has been found here to be
present in the LDC, the PA, and Proclus and which can also be said to be
present in Plotinus, al-Farabi and Avicenna. It appears then that it is quite
appropriate to consider creation to be of at least two sorts, creation 2 which is based on the notion of primary causality involving necessity 1 resulting from the
First as the Good and creation 1 which is also based on primary causality but adds
the Abrahamic understanding that the First creates without any sort of

39

Thomas Aquinas, In 2 Sent. d. 1, q. 1, a. 2, resp., Scriptum super libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi, Pierre Mandonnet, ed., Vol. 2, Paris 1929, 18. My translations here are
based on a pre-publication version of the text of Aquinas provided by Dr. Adriano Oliva, O.P,
president of the Commissio Leonina, Paris . The criterion of temporal creation indicated in the
third is shared with al-Kindi, though here Aquinas considers it something known only through
Christian faith. Aquinas also holds that creation is free and not necessitated. Detailed discuss ion of his views in relation to his other writings and in relation to the views set out in this
article will have to await another occasion.
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necessity, need not have created at all, and acts by will, in some understanding of
that term. 40

3. A Possible Objection: LDC 22 (Latin 22/23)
In light of the foregoing, it appears that the teachings in the LDC are not
properly described as those of creation 1 as understood in the religions of the
Abrahamic traditions since the freedom not to originate or not to create is not
present in the LDC. Rather, the doctrine set out in the LDC is that of creation 2,
namely, of emanation in the context of a clear understanding of the nature of
primary causality but without involving will, deliberation or choice on the part
of the First Cause in the origination of the world. That is, the doctrine of creation2 in the LDC is not a religious doctrine of creation 1 of the sort described by
Hasker.
However, an objection to this view might be formed on the basis of what is
found in chapter 22 (Latin 22/23) of the LDC. There the author follows Proclus,
Elements of Theology, proposition 134 closely albeit paraphrasing and simplifying
as well as drawing upon phraseology found in the PA. 41 The author also draws on
earlier reasoning from various chapters of the LDC, among them 1 for primary
causality, 4 (4/5) for the identification of the first created as the intelligence, and
8 (8/9) but particularly 19 (19/20) for governance, scil. the exercise of providence. Yet LDC 22 (22/23) is unique in the work for distinctly identifying the First
Cause as Allah, the Deity of the Abrahamic traditions, accompanied by laudatory
benedictions. Here is a translation of this chapter:
,Every divine intelligence knows things inasmuch as it is an intelligence and
governs them inasmuch as it is divine. For the special characteristic of the
intelligence is knowing and its completeness and perfection are that it be a
knower. But that which governs is God - may He be blessed and exalted! because He fills things with goodnesses. The intelligence is the first thing
originated (mubtada') and most similar to God - may He be exalted! -, so in
virtue of that it came to govern the things which are below it. And just as God40

In his late Commentary on the Peri Hermeneias, Aquinas writes that God is existing
outside the order of beings and that ,all things depend on divine will as on a first cause which
transcends the order of necessity and contingency (omnes dependeant a uoluntate diuina sicut a
prima causa que transcendit ordinern necessitatis et contingencie) ." Expositio libri Peryermenias
(Rome: Commissio Leonina; Paris 1989 [Opera omnia, 1,1] 78, 452-454. My thanks to Andrea
Robiglio for calling my attention to this passage.
41
The PA identifies the First with the one God of the Arabic tradition with terms such as
al-barf and al-khaliq, each Qur'anic words for Creator. It is worthy of note that each of the
two extant Arabic manuscripts of the LDC have Allah (God) and al-ilah (the god) in different
passages, perhaps a vestige of the original translation from Proclus. Note also that the chapter
ends with La yashakku fz dhalika shakkun ,that no one doubts", which is nearly identical with
PA Theology, ed. Badawi 73.7, la yashakku fz dhalika ahadun, Lewis, p.439, n.49.
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may He be blessed and exalted! - pours forth goodness on things, so too the
intelligence pours forth knowledge on the things below it. But, although the
intelligence governs the things which are below it, nevertheless God- may He be
blessed and exalted! - precedes the intelligence in governance and governs the
things with a governance more exalted than and superior to the governance of
the intelligence, because He is what gives <the power> to govern to the
intelligence.
The proof of that is that the things which the governance of the intelligence
does not reach, the governance of the Originator (mubdi', creatoris) of the
intelligence already reaches. For nothing whatsoever escapes His governance
because He wishes 42 that all things attain His goodness at once. For not every
thing yearns for the intelligence and is eager to attain it, but all things do yearn
for the First Good and are avidly eager to attain Him: that no one doubts! " 43
In the corresponding Proposition 134 of the Elements of Theology Proclus
reiterates the doctrine of primary causality stating that the Deity (to theion), in
this case referring to the One, the Good, extends its influence beyond the reach
of intelligence, something clearly expressed in the first sentence of the second
paragraph above. Yet that formulaic benedictions characteristic of the
Abrahamic traditions occur in this chapter of the LDC gives some reason for the
belief that for the author God as mentioned here is the Deity of the Abrahamic
traditions. Further, God - here called ,the Originator" ( mubdi', creatoris) and also the First Good - is the First Cause of all mentioned throughout the LDC.
On the basis of the evidence of the LDC, the author himself indeed seems to
have made precisely this identification and as well to have held that there is no
distinction between creation 1 and creation2 • Precisely how the author of the
LDC would have dealt with the issue of divine will and free creation or even
whether it would have been a concern to him has to remain an unknown matter
of speculation since, as pointed out earlier, the vocabulary of will (iriidah and
related terms) does not appear in the LDC. On the basis of the texts we have it
is apparent that the author identified Neoplatonic causality auto to einai o r
causality bi-annlyati-hi, that is, causality in virtue of its very being, as
characteristic of the True One, the Originator/Creator, the First Cause, the
Good, God, since no activity can be added to its essence without introducing
plurality into what is asserted to be pure Unity. Perhaps this should be of no
surprise since the same issue is found in the thought of Avicenna for whom the
First Cause acts not by necessity of nature or external or internal constraint of
the sort found below the First and associated with what has form, nor by choice,
deliberation or will, but as the Good, 44 which was also taught by Plotinus.
42

Note that earlier in section 2 I set aside the possibility that yuridu here is used to
indicate willing.
43
Taylor, The Liber de causis, Arabic 235-238; English 319-320 (revised).
44
See the account of Lizzini in her Fluxus (fayt;/). Indagine sui fondamenti della metafisica
e della fisica di Avicenna cited in note 34.
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4. Conclusion
In section 1 I considered the opening chapter of the LDC with its sources in
Proclus providing the translations of Dodds for the latter and providing my own
translation of the Arabic of LDC chapter 1. My purpose was to establish that
chapter 1 of the LDC is fully devoted to setting forth an account of primary and
secondary causality whereby the causal presence of the First Cause as primary
cause is argued to be more causally present to any effect than is any other cause
intermediate between those two. For the author of the LDC this is the
foundation for the argument that the First Cause originates or creates while all
other causes act by form and provide form. Hence, the reasoning of primary
causality explicates the view that there is but one First Cause or God and that
the origination or creation of being is characteristic only of the First.
In section 2 I examined the uses of forms of the terms fa'ala (agere, to act)
and abda'a (creare, to originate, to create) showing similarities of language and
doctrine in the LDC and the PA. Of particular importance is the presence of the
Neoplatonic notion of a thing acting by its very being and not by an act added to
its being. The author of the LDC adopted this notion from Proclus and in all
likelihood from the PA to argue that this sort of causality bi-annfyati-hi or in
virtue of its very being belongs only to the First Cause. In the PA this notion is
associated with the view of the First as above will, choice and decision and not
necessitated in its actions by any internal necessity (necessity 2) based on its nature or form or by any external necessity or compulsion (necessity 3 ). However,
insofar as it is the One and the Good, its emanative causality of all other realities
is not an act additional to its essence but rather follows immediately upon its
existence as the Good, the One, the First Cause (necessity 1). After arguing that
this activity is suitably called creation and distinguishing it as creation 2 in
contrast to creation 1 where this latter is a religious notion involving Divine free
will, I cited the early work of Thomas Aquinas in support of determining each of
these to be suitably called creation and rejected Hasker's view that emanative
origination should not be called creation. The foundation for this is the explanation of primary causality which is in accord with what Aquinas found in Avicenna and also in the LDC, a work which in that period Aquinas attributed to Aristotle.
In section 3 I weighed whether the use of Allah and of benedictions in LDC
22 constitutes an objection to my explanation of ibda' in the LDC as creation2
involving an emanation necessitated by the First as the Good (necessity 1) since
the use of of Allah and · of benedictions may be indicative of the Abrahamic
religious observance and a conception of free creation or creation 1• I found in the
LDC no evidence for a conception of free creation as creation 1 and concluded
that for the author of the LDC the emanative origination bi-annfyati-hi, that is,
in virtue of its very being, is understood as creation tout court.
The introduction of Greek philosophical teachings into the Islamic milieu
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of the Ninth century was both complicated and controversial. It was
controversial because it involved a claim to truth about matters relating to the
nature and structure of the world and also about the causes of the world,
including the First Cause or God, where religious believers already had answers
to these matters in holy scriptures. It was complicated because this meant that
the value of philosophy had to be argued and its apparent or real contradictions
to central religious teachings - such as the free creation of all reality by the one
God - at least initially in the early period of the ,Circle of al-Kindi" 45 posed
possible moments of conflict and correction. bi-annfyati-hi, that is, causality in
virtue of its very being. In the introduction to his On First Philosophy Al-Kindi
himself argues that philosophy and in particular metaphysics is just another way
to the truth and to the true understanding of God and His creation; hence,
when properly understood, philosophy should be accepted along side Islamic r evelation as another way to the same truths found in religion. 46 Al-Kindi's edition
of the PA's Theology of Aristotle sets out the doctrine of emanative creation biannryati-hi and, just as we find in the LDC, he himself adopted the doctrine of
primary causality in his short treatise on The True Agent and presents a proof of
divine unity in his On First Philosophy. Yet, al-Kindi embraced not an eternal
emanative creation2 but a doctrine of temporal creation 1 by a divine willing 47 in
accord with Islamic religious teaching. The teachings of the LDC on creation,
however, remain clearly within the philosophical tradition of the
Neoplatonism. 48

45

See G. Endress, ,The Circle of al-Kindi. Early Arabic Translations from the Greek and
the Rise of Islamic Philosophy", in: The Ancient Tradition in Christian and Islamic Hellenism.
Studies on the Transmission of Greek Philosophy and Sciences Dedicated to H.]. Drossaart Lulofs,
ed. Gerhard Endress and Remke Kruk, Leiden 1997, 43-76.
46
The entire preface is dedicated to the advocacy for philosophy to be accepted in the
context of Islam. For the text, see Oeuvres Philosophiques et Scientifiques d'al-Kindi, ed.
Roshdi Rashed and Jean J olivet, Vol. 2, Leiden/Boston/Koln 1998, 8-17.
47
See note 36 above. Also see Adamson, Al-Kindi, 57-62 on The True Agent, 47-57 on
divine unity, and 98-101 on eternity and temporal creation.
48
I am pleased to express my thanks to Cristina D'Ancona Costa, Jan Opsomer, Luis X.
L6pez-Farjeat, Andrea Robligio and Owen Goldin taking the time to read this article and for
offering several very valuable suggestions.
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